Responses :
Were any government reports or statements issued before the impact
of the 1997-98 El Niño appeared?
The NMSA
regularly collects meteorological information and prepares advisory
reports/outlooks regularly at the beginning
of each season and produces dekedal flash, monthly and mid-season assessments
and outlooks for decision-makers and users (Babu 1999b, 68). NMSA
forecasters discuss the developing weather before the information is released
to the users. After the discussion within the organization, the NMSA invites
the major users of the weather information, such as the Ministry of Agriculture
and the DPPC, to add their input before a forecast is issued [1] .
The NMSA was following the development of the seas surface
temperature in the Pacific Ocean since it heard about the evolving El Niño in
March 1997. Monthly reports about the evolution of the El Niño were discussed,
evaluated and written in the NMSA’s monthly Climate Bulletin. The NMSA
did not rush to issue its forecast based on initial El Niño reports until the
SST on the Pacific Ocean reached a record temperature of +4 in May 1997. On May
29, 1997 (Ginbot 19, 1989 E.C), NMSA issued a forecast in
the Climate Bulletin and Seasonal Outlook, which stated, “the 1997 Kiremt
rainfall would deviate from the normal in its quantity and quality of
distribution because of the El Niño phenomenon” (NMSA 1997b, in Amharic).
It warned of the negative impacts of the 1997 El Niño on the Kiremt
rainfall. The DPPC Early Warning Department echoed the NMSA forecast to the
various users saying, “The current Meher season will be influenced by
the El Niño phenomenon, which may result in irregular and deficient Meher
rains in several areas” (DPPC, June 1997, page 2). It also added the following:
“The
National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA) has issued a seasonal forecast
for the coming Meher season. The forecast indicates that the current Meher
season will be influenced by the El Niño phenomenon, which could result in
irregular and deficient rains. The El Niño influence is expected to be strongly
felt over Eastern and Southern Tigray, North and South Wello, and North Shewa
in Amhara; Central and eastern Oromiya including parts of Arsi and Bale; Harari;
Dire Dawa; and border Somali regions” (DPPC, June 1997, 3).
The early
warning later received unprecedented national attention on August 27, 1997. The
threat was acknowledged by the Prime Minister’s Office by announcing that
“rainfall activity in Ethiopia is decreasing under the effect of El Niño” (ENA
8/29/1997; Addis Zemen, Nehase 23 1989 (EC); Ethiopia Herald
9/2/1997). In their regular quarterly meeting at the end of August 1997, high
level officials from the Federal Government and Regional States discussed the
possible negative impact of El Niño. During the meeting, the officials
discussed the late start of the Kiremt rainfall in many parts of
Ethiopia and warned that if the rains stopped before the crops matured, it
might lead to a food shortage. They also discussed the strengthening of
responses at the federal and regional levels, and prepared for emergency
responses with the participation of the regional officials in the quarterly
meeting. The problem was transmitted to the regions very quickly. Responses to
the 1997 El Niño were to be implemented by the various ministries and agencies,
including the National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA), the Ministry of
Agriculture (MoA) and the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
(DPPC).
The government
agency responsible for the response and evaluation of the threat at the
national level was the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee
(NDPPC), which was under the Prime Minister’s Office. Following the May 1997
forecast, the NDPPC advised the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Bureaus to design a strategy of response. At the national level, the Ministry
of Agriculture, the Ministry of Water Resources, the DPPC and other agencies
designed their plans to respond to the erratic weather. The Regional States,
which chair the DPPBs, gave direction to the zones and Weredas in their
region on reducing the impact of the abnormal weather.
As a member of
the NDPPC, the Ministry of Agriculture came up with a strategy to reduce the
impact of the 1997-98 El Niño (MoA 1997, handwritten, unpublished). It
predicted that there would be a reduction of approximately 40 percent in food
production due to the expected early cessation of rainfall during the 1997 Kiremt.
At the end of June 1997, there was no precipitation to plant the Meher crops.
The 1997 Kiremt was characterized by the reduced planting of the long
maturing crops, such as maize and sorghum, the creation of a conducive
environment for pests and worms, and the reduction in the use of fertilizers
(MoA 1997).
The 1997
reduction in the use of fertilizers was due to the elimination of subsidy by
the government. Farmers were also faced with the limited capacity of replanting
their crops due to a shortage of oxen and seeds. The Ministry of Agriculture,
in order to reduce the impact, recommended the following actions:
1.
The
provision of late planting crops, such as chickpeas to farmers (MoA, 1997).
2.
Replanting
of destroyed crops with other fast maturing crops, such as chickpeas, teff,
lentils and guay.
3.
The
provision of farmers with seeds until the end of August.
4.
Observing
the spread of pests and worms and the protection of crops from pests by
distributing free anti-pest chemicals to farmers.
It also
recommended the irrigation of land by the newly completed micro-dams. As part
of the water and soil conservation program, farmers were building various
micro-dams before the onset of the drought. The Ministry of Agriculture advised
on the construction of canals so that water could flow to the farms. Farmers
were to be advised to plant potatoes and sweet potatoes. It also recommended
the provision of extension support with a new focus on the environmental
emergency. The major focus was to provide drought resilient crops (MoA 1997).
The Ministry of Agriculture also introduced a plan to save livestock by
converting failed crops into fodder. It recommended the orderly migration of
animals from the drought affected areas into areas with better seasonal
rainfall, and the purchase of livestock by the government and the provision of
fodder. It also planned to strengthen existing ponds and create new ones for
human and animal consumption. Finally, it recommended a quick study and the
implementation of disaster prevention techniques through the coordination of
regional, zonal and district Ministry of Agriculture representatives and other
relevant offices.
The various
recommendations were to be implemented by the regional states because of the
decentralization introduced by the federal form of government. A case study for
the implementation of the NDPPC response can be seen by the experience of the
Tigray Regional State, the Mugulat Tabia, included in this study.
Farmers in
Tigray who were interviewed for this research clearly remember the abnormal
rainfall of October and November, and how it spoiled their harvest. They said
that it was very good for the animals because of the rainfall. They said that
they did not get any special advice on the severity of the harvest rain. If
they had known that it would rain that much, they would have constructed a
platform for their harvested crops, saving them from germination because of the
water that seeped through the ground. They were able to save some un-germinated
grains for seeds by the separating the top from the bottom during processing.
Farmers believe that the Ministry of Agriculture’s Development Agents (Das) are
usually wrong about their predictions, and some farmers do not take them
seriously.
Were any reports issued after the impacts appeared?
The National Meteorological Services Agency
reported an evaluation of the 1997-98 Kiremt
and the Synoptic Forecast for the 1997-98 bega
season (NMSA 1997b). The report compared the May forecast with the actual
course of events and forecast that heavy rainfall would continue in the bega season. It also evaluated the various
impacts of the weather to agriculture. In the report, it referred to El Niño as
the main factor for the anomalous weather of the period.
There were reports from the Regional States
about the initial impact of t1997’s abnormal weather. In its evaluation of the
1997 Kiremt rainfall, the Tigray
Regional Early Warning Committee wrote the following that reflects the
situation in the various villages:
“ Except for the first week of May, there was
good rainfall that lasted until the end of July. The last week of July and the
first week of August showed a tendency for reduced rainfall. This was in
contradiction to the seasonal forecast given to us by NMSA which stated that
there would be dry spells in June and July.” (Kunetat
Kiramat: Kab Sene-Hamle 25/89, in Tigrigna, unpaged and
unpublished)
The DPPC issued a Special Report on El Niño in
October 1997 (DPPC October 1997). The DPPC argued that the 1997-98 abnormal
weather conditions were the result of El Niño. It also stated drought in
Ethiopia is associated with El Niño events.
The major report after the impact of El Niño was
the food aid appeal to donors by the DPPC in August 1997. The appeal did not
get the expected response from the donor community. On April 9, 1998, the FAO
appealed to the international community to make relief contributions to
Ethiopia (Reuters 4/9/ 1998). The DPPC also showed that the 1998 belg production was also down following the
erratic rainfall and appealed to the international community to help the
affected population (DPPC 8/1998).
The concern on
the part of donors was most likely because of the euphoria in Ethiopia in
response to the bumper harvest of 995-96 and the talks of exporting for the
first time in the previous year. During this time, the DPPC had under-estimated
the number of beneficiaries in Ethiopia by more than 50 percent. It had revised
the 1997 needy people from 1.6 million to 3.4 million people. The DPPC was
forced to make three appeals for food aid in 1997. It was an uphill battle to
convince donors to provide food aid.
What were the major
responses to the event?
There were many
responses to the 1997-98 climate-related disasters, such as weather forecasts,
agronomy-based agricultural responses, and the mobilization of resources to
fill the food gap created by the event.
The NMSA, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Regional States responded to the erratic Kiremt
season by advising farmers on alternative responses as the seasons progressed.
As stated earlier, the May 29 1997 forecast was issued to all the regions and
relevant ministries. The main advice to farmers was to replant their crops. The
problem of seed shortage for replanting when the rains arrived in August 1997
forced many zonal offices to provide farmers with credits to buy fast maturing
seeds from the local market (FAO/WFP 12/19, 1997). When the 1997 Kiremt
season was over, the floods of October and November disrupted the harvest.
The NMSA
disseminated information about the weather to users, such as farmers, the
government and NGOs. Ethiopian regional states initiated programs to inform
farmers about El Niño and its impact (MoA 1997). The government educated the
farmers both through the radio and the extension system. The government stated,
“that heavy rainfall was to be expected much later than normal in the Kiremt
season, in spite of the fact that in some areas the rain appeared to have
stopped” (Thompson 1998, 98). Farmers were advised to harvest the long maturing
crops that were planted during the belg season. They were also advised
to plant fast maturing crops and to take advantage of the rains.
One of the
tasks of the government was to provide short-term weather information to
farmers. On November 12, 1997, NMSA urged farmers “to gather their harvest
before an untimely rain expected over the various parts of the country” (Xinua
11/12/1997). The forecast stated that an unexpected rain was to hit many parts
of the country. With the increase in rainfall during the harvest season, the
Ministry of Agriculture advised farmers to harvest the matured grains. It also
“appealed to farmers to dig drainage ditches in fields where crops were not yet
ripe.” It appealed to regional officials to help store any salvaged crops. The
government said “unless ripe crop is collected and sheltered, the country’s
expected grain harvest in 1997, which is expected to be much less than the
previous years, could even be much worse” (Reuters 10/24/1997). Popular
campaigns were launched to help farmers harvest crops, such as teff,
wheat and barley (FAO/WFP 12/19/1997).
One of the
responses of the Ethiopian government to the expected disaster was to appeal to
the international community for relief aid. In August 1997, the DPPC appealed
for food aid, but did not receive any prompt response by donors (DPPC August
21, 1997, 2). The Ethiopian government also requested the “early deployment of
the Annual FAO/WFP Crop Production and Food Needs Assessment Mission” to
Ethiopia in order to respond to the disaster as early as possible (UNDP
9/1997). One of the characteristics of the 1997-98 response was that the donors
and the Ethiopian government agreed to create a joint crop assessment team to
avoid contradictory reports. It was also aimed at raising the confidence of
donors concerning the reports and food aid appeals.
The DPPC and
the FAO sent assessors to the grain producing areas to assess the state of food
production in the wake of drought and flood in 1997-98. When the floods
continued unabated into October and November the government instructed the team
members that were assembled from the various ministries to stay in the field
for two more weeks so that they might provide accurate information on the
impact of the abnormal rains. In the southern part of the country, peasants and
mechanized farmers delayed the harvest and waited for the right dry weather.
The results of
the harvest assessment of October and November 1997 by the DPPC, USAID, and EC
confirmed earlier fears of harvest shortfalls in Ethiopia. On November 29,
1997, Ethiopia again appealed to the donor community for 572,835 MT of food aid
for 1998 stating that 4,262,515 people were in need of immediate assistance (Addis
Tribune, 12/5/1997). This was later adjusted in May1998 to 580,000 MT
following the assessments of the pastoral areas and the 1998 belg crops,
as well as the post-harvest assessment of the 1997 Meher output. The DPPC
showed the gravity of the situation by stating that there is no carry-over
stock from 1997, and that food had to be distributed in several areas as soon
as December 1997 (ibid.). The reason for the high food deficit in Ethiopia in
1997-98 was due to the climate abnormalities.
The major component of the appeals in 1997-98 was for the
emergency relief. The food shortage was critical, beginning as early as
December 1997, in central and northern Ethiopia. Resource constraints of no
carry-over stocks from 1997 and limited government resources compounded this.
The 1998 pledge by donors for emergency relief was 352,249 MT, including the
outstanding 1997 pledges of 39,000 MT, which was delivered in 1998. Therefore,
the gap of required food against the updated requirement was 255,750 MT.
The actual delivered amount by donors was 303,987 MT as shown in Table 8.
Table 8. 1998 Food Aid Status (MT)
(As of 10/27/98)
|
No |
Donor |
Pledge |
Consignee |
Delivery
Status*
|
Remarks |
||
|
|
|
|
DPPC
|
NGOs |
Delivered |
% of total |
|
|
1 |
USA |
141,156 |
125,156 |
16,000 |
121,109 |
86 |
|
|
2 |
WFP |
60,000 |
60,000 |
- |
43,685 |
73 |
|
|
3 |
EU |
44,350 |
- |
44,350 |
44,350 |
100 |
|
|
|
EU |
- |
- |
22,620 |
22,620 |
- |
1997 pledge |
|
4 |
Sweden |
31,000 |
31,000 |
- |
31,000 |
100 |
|
|
5 |
UK |
18,792 |
- |
18,792 |
17,892 |
95 |
|
|
6 |
Netherlands |
10,000 |
10,000 |
- |
- |
- |
|
|
7 |
Germany |
3,718 |
- |
3,718 |
3,718 |
100 |
|
|
8 |
Norway |
1,950 |
- |
1,950 |
1,950 |
100 |
|
|
9 |
Canada |
- |
16,380 |
- |
16,380 |
- |
1997 pledge |
|
|
Canada |
1,000 |
- |
1,000 |
- |
- |
|
|
10 |
Denmark |
740 |
- |
740 |
740 |
100 |
|
|
11 |
Various/Local |
543 |
543 |
|
543 |
100 |
|
|
Total |
|
313,249 |
243,079 |
109,170 |
264,987 + 39,000 |
85 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
303,987 |
|
|
* Delivery
includes loans from the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve (EFSR).
Ethiopia succeeded
in averting a disaster in the 1997-98 El Niño. The drought and floods of 1997
did not lead to starvation and death due to the timely response of the government.
According to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the timely response to the crisis
by the Ethiopian government avoided the death of people due to famine (Addis
Tribune 3/13/98). Meles said that the good weather expected for 1998 would
be exploited by sending timely inputs, such as seeds and fertilizer, to farmers
(ibid.).
The public and
official optimism of the 1996-97 record harvest was dashed because of the
1997-98 El Niño. The ability of the National Food Security Reserves
Administration’s capacity to respond to emergency was also tested to its
limits. There was a slow response by the donors to the DPPC’s appeals. The
initial relaxation by donors might have been because of Ethiopia’s 1996-97
success in food production. In March 1997, donors had transferred (borrowed)
food from the Ethiopian reserves for their programs in Ethiopia and the
neighboring countries. In hindsight, it would have been better for the food to
stay in Ethiopia and for the neighboring countries get their food directly from
the donors.
The response of
the Ethiopian government and farmers saved some crops. Food production in
1997-98 was much lower than in 1996-97. However, it could have been worse
considering the double danger of drought and flood in 1997. The Ministry of
Agriculture advised farmers for the 1998 belg season. In 1997-98, its
extension department introduced a package that encouraged farmers to make
greater use of the belg rainfall. This package was designed to take
advantage of the forecast that the belg season of the 1998 El Niño year
might be above normal. However, the belg rainfall was brief and
unpredictable, despite the forecast.
The government
has also introduced policies that would strengthen the capacity of the
vulnerable districts to future drought disasters. According to Mr. Ibrahim
Mohammed (5/2000) of the Ministry of Agriculture, the areas that are worst
affected by El Niño or La Niña are usually those that are considered drought
prone. When there is a perturbation from the normal weather, the impact is felt
in these areas very easily. According to a new policy introduced by the FDRE,
he stated that the drought prone Weredas are selected as “food security
unit Weredas” in all regions of the country. The DPPC, the
Ministry of Agriculture and others are involved in finding permanent ways of
resolving the problem of food security in these areas (Xinhua, July 3,
2000). The Ministry of Agriculture is the coordinator, and there is a
fund directed for these endeavors. The objective is to prepare these districts
for a long-term effective response to droughts.
A Regional Example of Response to the 1997-98 El Niño
The research
attempted to investigate the response to the 1997-98 El Niño in one region of
Ethiopia [2] . Data collected from the Tigray Region
and Mugulat Tabia (cluster of villages) indicate that the 1997-98
El Niño-based forecast about the deficiency of the Kiremt rainfall was
first passed to them through the May 29 NMSA seasonal forecast (Hadera
2000). The regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness structure was revived
immediately to provide adequate response to the crisis. It is believed that
during normal weather conditions, the regional early warning committees were
weak, inactive and met irregularly. But when the strong early warning about the
possibility of drought was announced by the NMSA, the regional Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness Committee, which is headed by the State President,
met on July 8 (Sene 28 E.C.), two weeks after receiving the NMSA early warning.
The first
meeting of the Regional DPPC decided to meet regularly every two weeks to
evaluate and follow up the impending disaster. Zonal and district level
Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Departments (DPPD) were also instructed to
do the same. Information coming from the NDPPC in the capital was to pass down
smoothly, and ground level information was to go to the center immediately. The
Regional DPPC met and decided to identify the Weredas that were prone to
disaster, the size of arable land, and the number of animals and population in
the region.
The committee
members discussed how to respond to the possible disaster. They decided to
identify the rivers in the disaster prone areas and discussed how to use them.
The objective of the Regional DPPC was to harvest every drop of water for food
production. The “use of every drop of water” was to be realized through
the re-direction of floods to the farms. Mr. Yohannes (2000) also stated that
deliberate and controlled flooding of farms increased precipitation of the
soil, but that this requires follow up to avoid water logging and washing of
the top soil.
Preserving
cattle, especially in the Raya districts, where most of the regional cattle are
located, was one of the responsibilities of the Tigray Regional DPPB. Raya was
provided with veterinary services and supported to organize the orderly
migration of the cattle to better-endowed areas. The cattle migrated to the
Tekeze Valley in the north and to the neighboring Region III (Amhara State) to
graze with the consent of the latter. When the rain returned, the animals later
returned to their homes. The price of animals declined, and 10,000 animals died
in the district of Raya due to the 1997-98 drought.
After the end
of the July 8, 1997 (Sene 28 E.C.) meeting of the Regional DPPC,
including Zone DPPC representatives, who were members, the latter went back to
their Zones to convene a meeting that included Wereda DPPC members.
These members would later inform farmers about the emergency. When the second
RDPPC meeting was held on July 25, 1997 (Hamle 15), the ZDPPC representatives
came with their reports based on their prior meeting at the zone level. This
second meeting evaluated the two-week activities of response to climate
variability in the whole region of Tigray.
The RDPPC
received all the information from the Wereda and Zone Disaster
Prevention and Preparedness Committees. It discussed and identified the
strengths and weaknesses of the responses. These exercises led to the
identification of the most affected Weredas in Tigray. They corrected
those identified weaknesses related to water harvesting, such as flooding the
farms. These were corrected in favor of digging ponds around farms and
directing the floods to fill them. Some of the waterlogging was later
corrected. The region gained lasting experience in terms of drought management
and rain harvesting from the response to the 1997-98 El Niño. Currently, water
harvesting is part of the package of extension education given to farmers in
Tigray.
A Tabia
is a cluster of three or four villages that is administered by unsalaried
elected local officials. At this level, the Ministry of Agriculture’s
Development Agent (DA) gives agricultural advice. The DAs advise farmers about the
weather forecast and the use of fertilizer.
There were some
problems in the relationship between the center and the regions that affected
response to drought. It was found that NMSA forecasts usually arrive late to
the early warning department office. This is still true today. There are no
agro-meteorologists to interpret the meteorological data, making it difficult
to understand. NMSA sends the weather forecast to the Regional Administration,
which then sends the information to the RDPPC. For example, the ten-day flash
reports faxed from the NMSA do not arrive at the office of the early warning
immediately. The regional early warning department does not even have a fax
machine (Hadera 2000). Monthly information from NMSA is sometimes compiled and sent
to the Early Warning Department. When asked about this, the NMSA said the
information is sent to the regional administration, which then distributes it
to the relevant departments. However, the experiences in 1997 show that during
real disaster forecasts, the regional administration mobilize its resources and
responds immediately.
Reliability of
national forecasts and realities in various locations is a problem. Forecasts
are generally correct at the national level, but problems of accuracy appear in
specific regions. Decadal updates of seasonal forecasts reach the users late.
The Wereda
is the last tier of government and is very important in gathering information
about agricultural activities and weather impacts. However, there are no DPPC
and NMSA offices at the Wereda level. The chairman of the WDPPC is the
head of the Wereda economic affairs section. And the secretary is the
Ministry of Agriculture representative. The local agronomist, the veterinarian
and the various associations, such as, youth, women and indigenous NGOs, are
members of the WDPPC.
The
representatives of the various line ministries at the Wereda level do
not consider their activities as members of the early warning committee as
important (DPPC, Hadera 2000). The problem lies with the absence of a DPPC
branch office at the Wereda level. The Ministry of Agriculture is
active in post–harvest crop assessment, including assessing and identifying the
areas that would face food shortages. However, it usually puts non-farm socioeconomic
activities that are important for climate-related disaster response into a
secondary position.
A Village Example of the Response the 1997-98 El Niño
In an interview
with farmers, we understand that farmers receive various types of advice from
the Ministry of Agriculture [3] . The process calls for the DA to come to
the Tabia and brief the farmers on government policies and programs. The
DA also collects information and demands from the farmers, which is then transmitted
to the Wereda administrator. The agenda of meetings between farmers and
the DA usually deal with the supply of agricultural inputs. Meetings are also
held to evaluate and program water and soil conservation measures, such as the
construction of terraces, ponds, and the distribution of seedlings for
afforestation. Village leaders are sometimes required to go to the Wereda
administration to air their concerns and be briefed about government policies.
During
meetings, the DA passes information about the seasonal weather forecast and its
impact on farming (Baireu 2000). During the 1997 El Niño, no special meeting
was held to advise farmers about the seasonal weather. In 1997, the DA advised
the Mugulat farmers that the Kiremt rainfall would be dry, and
that they should not hurry to plant their crops. This information was based on
the forecast given by NMSA. None of the village leaders had heard of the word
El Niño or its impact.
Thus, the
reality of retailing weather information to specific villages can be
problematic. During the 1997 El Niño, farmers in the village of Atebes
ignored the advice of the DA and planted before it rained in accordance with
their tradition. However, some villages in the lowlands followed the advice of
the DA, which was that the rains would be late. Therefore, they did not plant
(Baireu 2000). The rains came, and those who did not plant regretted accepting
the advice of the DA on the weather. One of the problems in 1997 was that the
DA did not return to the Tabia to update farmers on the changing weather
situation. When the farmers questioned the DA about his misinformation in the
next meeting, he did not have any satisfactory answer. This could undermine the
credibility of the early warning system.
The contempt of
farmers for the DA was stated by Mr. Hailu who said “the difference between us
(farmers) and the DA is that they have finished the 12th grade
education and know how to read and write, and we do not. As far as farming is
concerned, they do not know anything better than we know. On the contrary, they
do not know the type of local weather in the villages or when the rains
normally start.” As far as weather information was concerned, he “trusts the
national radio weather forecast rather than the information given to the
village by the DA. The national radio does not give specific information about
rains or clouds. It says it is going to rain in the northwestern or eastern
part of the country, and it usually does.”
The above
statements show the problems of distributing weather information to local users
in Ethiopia. Forecasts at the local level are often wrong, and one could lose
credibility in the face of the farmers as happened in 1997 at Mugulat Tabia.
The Tigray Regional
State worked hard to implement the anti-disaster responses in 1997-98. All
early warning committees at the Region, Zone and Wereda levels were
meeting every two weeks to evaluate the responses. In 1997-98, there was an
acute shortage of food, but no one died because of lack of food (Hadera
2000). The unusual heavy rains and floods of October- November were good
for the Raya district, which had lost its 1997-98 belg, and Kiremt
harvests. The farmers in Raya opportunistically planted their land and collected
some harvests. In January 1998, there were unseasonable crops (such as
chickpeas) in various parts of Tigray. These crops were planted to take
advantage of the unseasonable rains.
Ethiopia has a
good institutional infrastructure conducive to the flow of information. The
Early Warning Committees from the Wereda to the national level are
re-activated and strengthened during disasters. One of the problems identified
was the lack of competent personnel and materials at the regional level. For
example, the Tigray Regional Early Warning Department has only three employees.
They have no agro-meteorologists, no information processor, and no functioning
photocopier, limited access to long distance telephones, no Internet
connection, and no fax machine. The situation is worse at the Zone and Wereda
levels where there are no disaster prevention and preparedness officers, as
well as inadequate office equipment (Yohannes 2000). Despite all of these
constraints, the Regional early warning system has been effective in dealing
with disasters.
One of the
major problems in the Ethiopian response to weather abnormalities is the
absence of meteorological data. The data for the last four decades is small and
limited to few urban areas. Although the government plans to put 1000 weather
stations in various parts of the country, it has succeeded in setting up only
600. Ethiopia has diverse climatic zones, which makes it imperative to have
many weather stations, especially with agricultural activities.
Identify (with citations if possible) the extent
of national research (in the last 20 years).
Many climate-related disasters have affected Ethiopia in the last
three decades. Diverse research activities were conducted on El Niño and
disasters in Ethiopia. As stated in Part C, the NMSA was active in the area of
El Niño’s impact on Ethiopia. Haile (1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b) [only 1 1988
reference in bibliography.], the former manager of the NMSA of Ethiopia has
written extensively on the impact of El Niño on Ethiopian droughts. He believes
that ENSO, as well as sea surface temperature anomalies in the Southern
Atlantic and Indian Oceans, combined with anthropogenic activities, cause
Ethiopian drought. Kassahun Bokretsion (1987, 1999), the current Manager
of NMSA, and a long time weather expert, at the same organization has
researched the weather systems, forecasts and climate changes in Ethiopia. His
research also shows that El Niño events affect climate variability in Ethiopia.
Amare Babu (1990, 1999a, 1999b,) [bibliog.] of the NMSA has correlated the
Southern Oscillation Index for the different seasons of Ethiopia. He concluded
that there is a correlation of .8 between Kiremt
rainfall and the SOI. Ininda el. al. (1987) have written on the relationship
between the characteristics of Ethiopian rainfall and ENSO. The NMSA issued a
report on the impact of El Niño on Ethiopian weather. There are other
publications by NMSA, such as evaluation reports and annual reports, which deal
with the impact of El Niño on Ethiopian weather (NMSA 1990, 1997a, 1997b,
1997c, 1998).
There were also some research activities
conducted about the impact of drought on Ethiopia. Wolde Mariam (1984) studied
the famines that affected Ethiopia between 1958 and 1977. It is a detailed
study of the whole country, and he concludes that the subsistence farmers are
vulnerable to famine due to the lack technological change and lack of
participation in the decision-making process. MacCan (1987) studied the social
history of famine evolution in Northeastern Ethiopia. He argues that population
pressures and lack of productivity led to the destitution and eventual famine
of the peasantry. Rahmato (1991) researched the survival strategies of peasants
and concluded that peasants mobilize their resources and knowledge to cope with
climate-related disasters such as drought and famine. Dawit Wolde Giorgis
(1987) has written about the problems of relief distribution during the 1985
famine in Ethiopia.
Research on the use of El Niño as an early warning is in its
infancy in Ethiopia. Many studies conducted at the NMSA are not usually
published in international journals. There have been unpublished research
projects in the area of drought response in the DPPC. However, more needs
to be done to address the acute nature of the problem.
Is there a
national plan to respond to disaster in Ethiopia?
There is a five-year strategic National Disaster Prevention and
Preparedness Plan for the 1998-2002 period. It was drafted by the DPPC with the
participation of Regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureaus (DPPBs),
who enriched the national plan through their regional plans (DPPC Five Year
Plan, 1998). Although the national disaster planning process was developed by
accommodating inputs from the draft regional plans, for a detailed and
authoritative plan for the regions, reference has to be made to their
respective plans (ibid.).
The five-year plan was developed because of the need to link
relief and development through long-term planning and coordination of various
agencies. Ethiopia’s donor partners had also been asking for a multi-year
plan. This plan was prepared with the transparent participation of many
groups, including the donors, regions, multilateral agencies and NGOs.
According to the DPPC, the plan would act as an inspiration and a common
framework for all involved in Ethiopian disaster prevention.
This plan
discusses the various types of disasters in Ethiopia, the hazards, and the
state of vulnerability. It also highlights recent government activities in
disaster prevention, preparedness and response. It also analyzes the
political, economic and social environment, and the strengths and weaknesses of
the various government agencies in implementing disaster prevention and
preparedness in Ethiopia. It identifies the core programs, aims, resources,
timing and responsible bodies for the implementation of the plan. Finally, it
reviews the possible obstacles for the implementation of the core plan and
highlights parts of the plan that need the support and cooperation of other
agencies.
The Ethiopian
government was faced with the climate-related impacts of “the El Niño of the
century” in 1997-98. It used all available information to forecast the
climate-related impact and raised resources from inside and outside the
country. What could have been a millennium disaster was averted, and people did
not die due to starvation.
Is El Niño
explicitly considered to be a disaster in your country?
El Niño is not
explicitly considered a disaster in Ethiopia. The NMSA has been using ENSO
information in its seasonal forecasts since 1987. It has also stated that El
Niño causes disasters in the country. However, the major disaster policies,
such as the 1998 Five Year Plan of the DPPC, do not mention El Niño explicitly
as a phenomenon that causes disasters in Ethiopia (DPPC 1998). Although it
mentions drought as the major cause of disaster in the country, El Niño is not
mentioned as a cause of drought in Ethiopia.
Identify
(with citations if possible) any international research about the impacts of El
Niño in Ethiopia.
The level of
international scientific research and interest on the impact of ENSO on
Ethiopia is very low; however, there is some growing international interest concerning
the impact of ENSO on Ethiopia. A statistical analysis by Attia and Abulhoda
(1992) shows that ENSO episodes are negatively correlated with Nile floods.
They concluded that El Niño affects the rainfall in highland Ethiopia, which
contributes 85 percent of the water to the Nile River.
Thompson el. al. (1998) wrote a paper titled “Information,
Risk and Preparedness: Responses to the 1997 El Niño” and selected the
Ethiopian government’s response to the 1997-98 El Niño event. Orlove and
Tosteson (1999) selected Ethiopia as a case study in their research on the
application of seasonal forecasts based on ENSO.