Governmental
options during the prevention phase, 1997 :
The Minister of the Presidency, Daniel Hokama, in the opening statements of an important speech to Congress in September 1997, outlined the government's principal options to deal with the arrival of El Niño. A rosy forecast was initially presented averring that "its appearance in front of the Peruvian coast in the month of April and its progressive intensification in the months of June and July had been providential, because it would prevent the sequel of rains and destruction that would have occurred had the phenomenon arrived in the summer, which was the usual case.” Hokama concluded that the worst anomalies would coincide with the coldest part of the year, which would fortunately inhibit the rise in temperatures necessary for torrential rains. This optimism coincided with the forecast issued by the scientists of the Peruvian Geographical Institute (IGP), predicting moderate summer rains for 1998.
Later on in his speech this moderate forecast began to fall apart. The minister’s concerns came to the forefront when he affirmed that the rains expected in the summer of 1998 could reach levels similar to 1983. Having said that, the thrust of the minister's presentation was inverted as he proceeded with an analysis of the regions damaged by the 1983 El Niño and the specific details of the resulting disasters.
The minister informed Congress that the worst scenario was a repetition of 1983, and, consequently, the plan should contemplate measures to avoid a disaster of that magnitude. The political prognosis was not based on a logical calculation of the evolution of certain parameters, but on a very interesting evocation of bureaucratic memory. The state, faced with a forecast of disaster, reacts by dusting off its old reports and proceeding as if the coming event will be a carbon copy of the past. This historically minded government proceeds empirically, recalling its previous steps. Scientists, on the other hand, formulate their forecasts based on weather patterns and logical analysis of the behavior of relevant variables. These two groups can only be reconciled by understanding how each one of the parties involved acquires information, formulates plans, and handles the concept of a forecast.[1]
As previously noted, the government's preventive plan consisted of civil engineering projects of riverbank fortification. Infrastructure protection was the government's leitmotiv. This strategy had virtues and defects, the main drawback being the absence of a plan directed at revitalizing production, which fell into severe recession. The preventive strategy itself, however, was very poorly implemented due to a centralist and individualist mindset abetted by a high degree of bureaucratic disorder. Overlapping areas of responsibility are one of the endemic secular afflictions of Peruvian bureaucracy that only got worst during the last El Niño.
Topping this state of affairs were the many delays in getting the civil engineering projects going, thereby diminishing their timeliness. The president acted quickly, but even he had to contend with the slow-moving wheels of the executive branch. For example, the drainage projects for El Niño in Piura did not get started until August 9. These high-priority projects for the area that was going to be hardest hit still had not commenced as the emergency rolled into its seventh week. Other projects designed to beef up the drainage system were finished after the rains had already begun and became dikes that actually dammed the water causing major flooding. Fujimori showed great dynamism, but the central apparatus is slow and although it is true that on this occasion it moved somewhat faster than usual, its traditional laziness was still evident.
[1] Daniel Hokama speech to Congress, Congressional documents found on the Peruvian Congress website at: http://www.congreso.gob.pe/index-e.htm.