

**The Quest for Human Security: Global Governance, Development and Peace
Building
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2005 is an important commemorative year for the world community. It is the 60th anniversary of the dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the 60th Anniversary of the United Nations. While the first two are important events to remember and commemorate it is the development of the United Nations that is the most important human achievement and the one worth celebrating. The United Nations –despite all its deficiencies and inefficiencies – is the only global institution whose primary purpose is the abolition of war and the elimination of poverty within a framework of individual and collective human rights. As the Charter puts it.

“We the peoples of the United Nations [are] determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”

These noble aspirations reflect the heart felt yearnings of all individuals for a world within which each person can realise his or her full potential, free from the fear of war and the scourge of poverty under the rule of law. If the United Nations did not exist it would have to be brought into existence. Since it does exist, it is absolutely vital that all of us work to ensure its success.

The peoples of the world need a United Nations system that is capable, effective and legitimate which is why I welcome this seminar with its focus on how to realise the founding vision of the United Nations in relation to global governance, justice and world peace.

The challenge confronting us in the 21st century is how to ensure that these United Nations visions are operationalized and implemented across the whole world. There will be no real security for the privileged and wealthy North as long as the bulk of the world's population lives in daily existential terror. This existential terror is caused by starvation, illness, pandemics, dislocation, lawlessness, homelessness, unemployment, under-employment, human trafficking and slavery, repressive and predatory governments and the violence generated by armed militia and self serving police and military.

The resolution of these problems requires the engagement of a wide variety of civil society and private sector actors as well as the co-operation of local governments, national governments, regional organizations and the United Nations. No one sector can solve these fundamental problems alone. Many national governments, for example, are under resourced, lack legitimacy and are incapable of generating real security for their citizens. Multilateral organizations also know that unless they have good relations with strong and capable local partners they too cannot generate growth, development and effective government. There are limits to what civil society actors can do on their own.

High levels of co-operation, therefore, are not optional extras for the United Nations and other multilateral bodies. They are pre-requisites for effectiveness. This is why the

Charter highlights the central importance of “international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” and for the promotion of human rights. It is also why it establishes the United Nations as the organizational Centre “for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends”. Building cooperative multilateral approaches to problem solving, therefore, lies at the heart of an effective United Nations.

We know from the past 60 years experience that the United Nations, works best when its constituent members are co-operating, the Security Council is in unity and when the specialised agencies are working closely together on matters of common interest. In these circumstances international Civil Servants are able to do their job and work effectively. When state parties are in fundamental disagreement with each other, or practicing a la carte multilateralism, professional work is that much more difficult and international civil servants have a much harder job. It is up to international civil servants, therefore, in collaboration with representatives of states committed to an effective United Nations, to facilitate conditions conducive to collaborative problem solving. If they cannot achieve such conditions the aspirations of the United Nations founders will be that much more difficult to achieve.

An Integrated Agenda for Peace and Development

The idea of bringing a number of formerly separate policy programmes into an integrated agenda has been a long time coming within the United Nations. The release of two seminal reports by former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *Agenda for Peace* (1992) and *Agenda for Development* (1995) set the stage for a more holistic look at violent conflicts in developing countries.¹ The OECD Development Assistance Committee followed suit by issuing *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent*

1 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992), UN Doc A/47/277-S/2411 (United Nations, 17 June 1992), available at <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>>; An Agenda for Development: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/48/935 (United Nations, 6 May 1994), available at <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agdev.html>>.

Conflict (1997 and 2001).² In 2001, Secretary General Kofi Annan released his report on *Prevention of Armed Conflict*.³ Collectively, these initiatives affirmed that the artificial separation between security and development institutions, policies and practices could no longer be sustained. They called for better integration between the international community's socio-economic, human rights, humanitarian, security and developmental strategies and approaches for conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. It has taken over a decade to begin getting these agendas together.

To prepare for this 2005 summit the Secretary General of the United Nations commissioned two major studies *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility –The Report of the UN's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (<http://www.un.org/secureworld>) and *Investing in Development: A Practical Guide to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals* (<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org>) . Both of these studies call for much bolder and more decisive action by state parties in relation to co-operative security and specific ways of meeting the millennium development goals. In addition the Secretary General developed his own report for the Summit which synthesizes these two studies and addresses the questions of humanitarian intervention which were mapped out in an earlier report *The Responsibility to Protect* (<http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>). The Secretary General's report *In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all: Report of the Secretary General* (<http://www.un.org>) is a bold and courageous statement which seeks to address the new security fears of the West (most of which flow from the terrorist attacks in New York, Bali, Madrid, Morocco, London; the oxymoronic war on terror, an absence of peace in the Middle East and the negative consequences of the war on Iraq) as well as the daily existential fears of the poor and impoverished all around the world.

2 DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2001), available at <http://www.gtz.de/security-sector/download/DAC_Guidelines.pdf>.

3 Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/55/985-S/2001/574 (7 June 2001), available at <<http://ods-dds.ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/404/64/PDF/N0140464.pdf?OpenElement>>.

Picking up the carefully balanced recommendations of all these reports would go a long way towards ensuring Human Security-Better Global Governance and Development for all. It is not at all clear, however, that the United Nations Summit is going to be able to achieve these different objectives. Before I analyse why there is a cloud hanging over the summit I would like to focus some attention on the basic terms, values and objectives that I feel should be guiding international relations at the present time.

The new vision is well captured by Koffi Annan when he states that we need new ways of thinking about generating larger freedom and true human security:

In the twenty-first century, all States and their collective institutions must advance the cause of larger freedom—by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both development and security also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law.⁴

The challenge facing policy makers seeking to give expression to this vision at this year's summit is how to secure sustainable and equitable economic growth, strong and resilient communities, protection of human rights, good governance and absolutely minimal levels of organised or spontaneous violence?

The Development- Security Nexus

As mentioned in the last section, development and security policy makers at the United Nations and elsewhere are beginning to combine their policy agendas and generate practical proposals which will eliminate both want and fear. They are able to do this because the reduced threat of inter-state wars has generated new opportunities for the international community to move from state-centered to human-centered perspectives of

⁴ Report of the Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly, 21 March 2005

security. Terrorist incidents, however, may still tilt the balance back towards state-centered concepts of security and are being used by the United States and some of its allies to reiterate a state centric rather than a human centred view of security .

What is becoming obvious to outside observers is that Koffi Annan and his advisors with the support of the developing world would like to bring the two agendas closer together. Powerful and economically advantaged states with a primarily military view of security, however, have vested interests in keeping the two apart. The theoretical and methodological link between development assistance and security or development and peacebuilding has been taking shape in what is known as the “development - security nexus”.⁵

A number of statistical studies have demonstrated how chronic poverty and underdevelopment generate conflict and vice versa.⁶ These studies have established that nations with higher incomes and societies experiencing rapid economic growth are less prone to civil conflict than those without such assets. Conversely, they acknowledge that underdevelopment generates weak states incapable of creating macro conditions conducive to development; unable to respond to national security threats, challenges to political legitimacy or sustained, organized crime and corruption.

The World Bank in its report *Breaking the Conflict Trap - Civil War and Development Policy*⁷ argued that war causes poverty but poverty also in turn also increases the likelihood of civil war. Countries with low, stagnant, unequally distributed per capita incomes and that are heavily dependent on primary commodities face “dangerously high risks of prolonged conflict”. This is further exacerbated by what the World Bank calls ‘the conflict trap’. This trap reflects the fact that once countries have experienced a conflict they double their chances of having another conflict within a five to ten year

5 See Kevin Clements and Necla Tschirgi, 2005 The Development –Security Nexus. Unpublished Paper presented to the Acpacs Conference on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific Region. University of Queensland April 2005.

6 For example, Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2001). “Greed and grievance in civil war”. Policy Research Working Paper 2355. Washington, DC: World Bank.

7 Paul Collier et al, 2003 *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* Oxford, OUP and World Bank

period. If they have experienced two conflicts their chances of another are quadrupled. All states, therefore, that have experienced violent political conflict have a high probability of reverting to violence in the next five years, unless there is rapid diversification out of primary commodities and tourism and or they can contain violent politics for a period of five to ten years.

One challenge facing policy makers, therefore, has to do with whether to focus attention primarily on economic growth or the strengthening of state capacity or to try and pursue both simultaneously. Insecurity, violent conflict and rampant corruption are all major obstacles to development. This has been demonstrated over and over again in all the internal conflicts of the world. Efforts aimed at addressing either development needs or internal security demands in isolation from each other often lead to the reemergence of conflict, insecurity among populations and continued underdevelopment.

In response to the growing calls for more effective conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding interventions, scholars, policy makers and practitioners have tried to identify development strategies sensitive to conflict and security approaches that can enhance human rights, human development and human security. It is in recognition of the holistic nature of this problem and the intimate links between development, politics and security that so much recent attention has been directed towards combining these agenda. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been agreed as the basic targets for a more equitable world.

The United Nations Millennium Development Goals

What is Development?

The concept of development is contested and controversial and has meant a wide variety of different things since it entered common parlance in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially, it meant whatever dominant economic and political powers (and their academic promoters) wanted it to mean which was normally some variant of competitive industrial capitalism and the process of transition from traditional undifferentiated communities to modern

differentiated societies. In the 1970s, however, development was appropriated by the poor and oppressed and seen in terms of liberation from dependent and crippling relationships. This new conception generated a radical critique of dominant development models.⁸ Most current commentators view development as processes which enhance the economic, political and social wellbeing of all sections of the population through time. If it benefits some groups at the expense of others then it might be considered growth but would not be considered development. If the development initiatives are unsustainable then there would also be a question mark over their long term suitability and utility. For progressive thinkers there has to be some notion of the advancement of the collective good for it to be considered 'true' development. Development is defined by the International Peace Academy as "the processes and strategies through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living." This definition assumes the expansion of material product, socio-economic growth, health, education and stable economic institutions. It has both processual and material dimensions, referring to the processes and strategies whereby individuals, communities and nations satisfy their material needs and being measured in terms of specific material outputs or outcomes. There are some qualitative 'quality of life' aspects but these are normally considered less important than quantitative 'hard' indicators as embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set for 2015

In the year 2000 the United Nations set the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as quantitative benchmarks against which the international community could judge progress on global development . These goals are as follows,

- (i) The eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.
- (ii) The achievement of universal primary education.
- (iii) The promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women.
- (iv) A reduction in child mortality.
- (v) An improvement in maternal health.
- (vi) Combating HIV/Aids, Malaria and other infectious diseases.

⁸ See Kevin P Clements, *From Right to Left in Development Theory*, 1979, Institute of South East Asian Studies, Singapore.

- (vii) Ensure environmental sustainability.
- (viii) Developing a Global Partnership for Development.⁹

The MDGs are minimal pre-requisites for developing a more equal, less divided world and for creating the conditions within which individuals can realize their full potential. They will not of themselves deliver more equitable growth, overcome horizontal inequality and exclusion or the problems of failed and failing states. They will, however, remove many of the fundamental obstructions to progress on these other issues.

The Millennium plus 5 Summit that is about to take place in New York in the next few weeks is the first opportunity that the global community has had to evaluate progress on these objectives and to develop more specific political commitments and mechanisms for achieving these goals. It also represents an important chance to reform the United Nations to make sure that it can play its role as the global guarantor of both security and development in the 21st century.

It is not only poverty and horizontal inequalities that are strongly connected to conflict but also particular types of political systems. Violent conflict, for example, tends to occur more within autocratic and non democratic political systems or within systems that are in transition. In terms of established democracies for example, only 12% were involved in civil war whereas 45% of one party dictatorships were involved in civil war and 30% of states with transitional or uncertain democracies were involved in civil war.¹⁰ Because of these associations it is important whether or not state systems are moving in a more or less democratic direction and vitally important that there are programmes which address governance issues simultaneously with development.

Throughout the 1990s there were important advances on both fronts as governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations initiated new policies, programs and projects that attempted to more adequately link up security and development in conflict-prone, conflict-torn or post-conflict environments.

⁹ 2005 Jeffrey D Sachs et al Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals New York Millennium Project. P 12

¹⁰ Dan Smith op cit p 14

Policy and programming innovations at the UN, for example, were met with similar advancements at the international, regional and domestic levels. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development, the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Network, and in my part of the world Australia's whole-of-government approach to support neighboring states like Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands have made major efforts to examine how integrated development and security strategies could be tailored for more effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The dramatic re-emergence of hard security threats in the early days of the 21st century galvanized countries into re-thinking their security policies on a global scale, unfortunately, this is resulting in new schisms within the international community about what strategy is most likely to be successful in dealing with both poverty and security. It is because of this that Koffi Annan's "In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All" attempts to generate common ground and forge a new consensus among UN member states on the interdependence between the security and development agendas at the country, regional and global levels.

Despite its apparent simplicity, however, the linkage between security and development is far from simple and raises a number of key questions. How are security and development conceived by policy makers, by donors and by local communities? To what extent is the failure of governance a failure of development? Have conventional development strategies played a role in the emergence and maintenance of conflict? If development models are even partially implicated in conflict and the failure of governance, how must development approaches be re-shaped to work against violence and to support human security? What are the sources of resilience in any society? How can development partnerships support local capacities? Can development goals be pursued under conditions of state failure and violent conflict and if so, how? What is the relationship between indigenous (local) and introduced (external) approaches to

governance and conflict management and what are the consequences of this relationship for conflict? Under what conditions are external security interventions helpful? Whose security is at stake? How can security interventions work to support development and long term conflict prevention goals?¹¹

In tandem with the heightened international awareness of the interdependence between security and development, the range of issues brought before the Security Council has broadened. Human rights abuses, protection of civilians in war, small arms, gender and peace, children and armed conflict and HIV/AIDS became legitimate issues for the Council's consideration.¹²

Simultaneously with developments at the UN, several governmental and non-governmental actors championed a range of issues that came to be subsumed under the new 'human security' agenda.¹³

The Human Security Agenda

The Commission on Human Security states that

“Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential...Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security”.¹⁴

11 The following few sections are drawn from Clements and Tschirgi, 2005 op cit.

12 David M. Malone (ed.) The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

13 There is extensive academic and policy literature on the concept of human security. For more information, see the extensive work of the Commission on Human Security under <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/>

14 See Commission on Human Security –<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/>.

Although the concept of Human Security is judged by some states to be a little fuzzy and too inclusive it remains very potent for reframing concepts of both development and security and how they are linked.

While national security is about the protection of States; Human Security is about the protection of individuals. States should be the primary security providers for their citizens. Often, however, they fail in this task. Indeed sometimes they violently persecute the very citizens that they are required to protect....the individual rather than the state should be the referent object of human security.¹⁵

The concept of human security has been much contested in the field of international relations.¹⁶ It has become, though, an important litmus test as to whether or not state systems are meeting the safety needs and interests of their citizens or if they are generating political fear, existential insecurity and repression. It is an equally important concept for determining the robustness of social and community life and whether or not weak and vulnerable societies are developmentally sustainable and capable of satisfying basic human needs in relation to food, health, shelter and environmental security.

A consideration of human security helps citizens make effective demands on leaders because it questions both security and development. As Frederick Douglass, an early abolitionist of slavery said, “power concedes nothing without demand”¹⁷ Human security as a political objective and an analytical construct enables citizens to raise very important political questions of those who have power. This is especially so in the developing world. The question is to what extent are the public and private spheres satisfying basic human needs to ensure freedom from both fear and want?

15 Andrew Mack, “The Concept of Human Security” p.47 Bonn International Center for Conversion, Brief 30 Edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter Croll October 2004

16 Keith Krause, op cit. In this chapter Krause argues for a narrower version of Human Security which focuses primarily on freedom of fear and removing the use of or threat of force and violence from people’s everyday lives. I think this is unnecessarily restrictive and argue that we should retain the twin objectives and bring them more closely together as they are intimately linked both conceptually and in practice.

17 The Guardian Weekly January 14-20 2005 p.13

Focussing on development issues, for example, while ignoring state incapacity or worse, state weakening and possible 'failure' (as was the case in the Solomon Island), is not going to deliver stable peace. Equally, state-centric security that focuses on the interests of the State and governance issues without addressing the medium to long term development and welfare needs of citizens will not affect the deeper structural sources of conflict which afflict many if not most developing societies. Both spheres of analysis and practice need to be combined.

The campaigns to ban anti-personnel landmines, to regulate small arms and light weapons, and to establish an international criminal court were part of the emerging international consensus around major issues that threatened human security and militated against human development.¹⁸

Meanwhile, on the ground, humanitarian workers, peacemakers, peacekeepers and development agencies responded to civil wars, ethnic conflicts and failed states with multiple and often disparate tools and instruments. The number of United Nations peacekeeping missions increased rapidly throughout the 1990s, totalling 15 missions in Africa, six missions in the Americas, four missions in Asia, nine missions in Europe and one mission in the Middle East.¹⁹ The new United Nations peace operations were radically different from traditional peacekeeping missions. Often deployed in contexts where there was little peace to keep, they involved a combination of military and civilian tasks including: civilian policing; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and the protection of refugees and internally-displaced people. Significantly, the UN even undertook direct administration of Kosovo and East Timor in the absence of a sovereign government in these territories.²⁰

18 Necla Tschirgi, *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*, Policy Paper, (International Peace Academy, October 2004).

19 For more information on the UN's peacekeeping operations and other peace and political missions in the 1990s, see the UN's website <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/index.asp>.

20 For a fuller understanding of the UN's role in transitional administrations, see Simon Chesterman: *You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

In line with policy and operational needs there have been various efforts to overcome the compartmentalization of the security and development institutions of the Cold War era. Throughout the 1990s, there were several waves of bureaucratic reform in the United Nations. These led to the creation of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Although each of these departments continued to have separate mandates and functioned in isolation from the UN's development agencies, various mechanisms were established to encourage inter-departmental and inter-agency cooperation or collaboration.²¹ The current proposal for a new Peacebuilding Commission is the most recent example of efforts to develop better linkages between the development, financial and security institutions of the UN in relation to conflict prevention and post conflict reconstruction.

There was a corresponding revision of institutional structures within individual governments and inter-governmental organizations as well. From Australia and Norway to the World Bank and the African Union, new units have been created to deal with conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peacebuilding. New inter-governmental and non-governmental networks were created. The UK, Canada and Sweden, for example, began to develop more 'joined up' government approaches to more closely align their foreign, security and development policies and programs to respond to intra-state conflicts.²²

Working in and Around Conflict

During the Cold War, development agencies deliberately refrained from getting involved in security issues, including violent conflicts. They saw their role primarily as promoting socio-economic development. When confronted with conflict, development actors

21 Michele Griffin, "The Helmet and the Hoe: Linkages Between United Nations Development Assistance and Conflict Management," *Global Governance*, 9, no.2 (2003)

22 For a quick review of selected innovations in this area, see: Ann M. Fitz-Gerald, "Addressing the Security-Development Nexus: Implications for Joined-Up Government," *Policy Matters* (Institute for Research on Public Policy, July 2004, Vol 5, no.5)

basically had limited options. The predominant approach was to work *–around* conflict treating it as a ‘negative externality’ to be avoided. When conflict erupted, development assistance was generally replaced by humanitarian assistance *in* conflict. In those cases where they were able continue their operations, development agencies worked while trying to minimize conflict-related risks to their programming. Only in exceptional cases were development actors prepared to work *on* conflict by seeking to address the sources of conflict through development programming.²³

The pervasiveness and intensity of intra-state conflicts and complex humanitarian emergencies of the 1990s led to a re-assessment of existing policies and instruments of aid. On the one hand, international donors began designing new programs and projects to respond better to peacebuilding objectives. Good governance, security sector reform, DDR, the rule of law and transitional justice became areas of innovative development assistance. Although programming in these sectors has largely been experimental and technical in nature, collectively these new programs involved a greater convergence between security and development objectives. Research undertaken by the International Peace Academy and other research institutions points to the fact that policy makers, program managers and field practitioners are increasingly developing a more robust understanding of the need to situate sectoral programs and projects within a larger development-security framework.²⁴

More important than new sectoral programs, however, has been a growing appreciation by development agencies of the need to gain a better understanding of the links between

23 Jonathan Goodhand, with P. Atkinson, *Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement: A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka* (London: International Alert, 2001).

24 Academic as well as evaluation research on new programming areas at the intersection of security and development has mushroomed in the last few years. There are numerous research programs that focus specifically on such areas as governance, security sector reform and transitional justice. The Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform based at Cranfield University in the UK for, example, deals specifically with SSR issues. In addition, there are new research programs (such as at King’s College in the UK and the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands) that examine the various dimensions of the linkages between conflict, security and development. The Security-Development Nexus Program at the International Peace Academy in New York was launched in late 2003 to undertake multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary research in this area. For more information on the IPA program, see: <http://www.ipacademy.org/programs>.

development strategies and violent conflict. There were a range of new studies, including the pioneering work on “Do No Harm,”²⁵ the OECD DAC study on the incentives and disincentives of development assistance²⁶, and various frameworks for conflict analysis.²⁷

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment

Peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) methodologies are specifically focused on the need to build conflict sensitivity into the design, delivery and evaluation of development initiatives to ensure that these have a positive impact on peacebuilding.²⁸ This new methodology goes by a variety of names. Some call it Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA)²⁹ although the acronym for this leaves something to be desired! Others call it Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA).³⁰ Others call it simply Peace and Conflict Assessment Models (PCA).³¹ All are referring to the development of conflict or security sensitive development strategies and/or developmentally sensitive conflict or security strategies. All of these models are based on recognition of the necessity for higher levels of analytic and programmatic integration between sustainable and inclusive development strategies and governance, security sector and justice strategies. In order to do this effectively it is important to make distinctions between

25 Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

26 Peter Uvin, “The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict” Summary report prepared for the Development Assistance Committee Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (Paris, OECD, 1999); also see the four country case studies on Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sri Lanka under the OECD DAC project on The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations.

27 Going beyond existing academic frameworks, donor governments, aid agencies and even non-governmental organizations developed their own conflict analyses and assessment tools. For a short review of the field, see, for example, Manuela Leonhardt, “Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries: A Review of Literature and Practice” (London: International Alert and Saferworld, 2000.) More recently see the Resource Pack produced by Fewer, Safer World and International Alert, 2004, *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian assistance and Peacebuilding*

28 For an assessment of PCIA methodologies, see: Mark Hoffman, “Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead End?”. In *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001, available at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/hoffman_handbook.pdf.

29 See Luc Reyhler, 1996 “Conflict Impact Assessment CIAS” paper presented at IPRA Conference Brisbane 1996.

30 See Kenneth Bush, 1998 “A Measure of Peace, Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones”, Working Paper 1 The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative and Evaluation Unit, IDRC Canada 1998

31 See Thania Paffenholtz and Luc Reyhler “Introducing the Peace and Conflict Assessment Model (PCA)” at <http://www.fielddiplomacy.be/2004>

developmental and peacebuilding outcomes and impacts and conflict and security outcomes and impacts.

Kenneth Bush, for example makes an important distinction between developmental impact (e.g more children attending school) and peacebuilding impact (e.g only children of one ethnic group attending school or only teachers of one ethnic group being recruited), which could lead to tensions or exacerbate existing conflict.³² These kinds of distinctions enable both development and security specialists to ascertain whether or not specific initiatives will address poverty, exclusion and marginalisation as well as structural and personal sources of violence. Bush reiterates this in a different way by saying that Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment is a means of assessing ways in which development or humanitarian intervention may affect, or has affected, the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region. In particular it focuses on its:

- (1) Peacebuilding impact or those factors that strengthen the chances for peace and decrease the chances that violent conflict will breakout, continue, or start again; and its
- (2) Conflict-Creating Impact, which are those factors that increase the chances that conflict will be dealt with through the use of violence.³³

According to Bush, to ensure that any initiative has a positive peacebuilding and developmental impact, it has only to answer 'yes' to the following two questions:

- (1) Does the initiative increase the capacity of locals to identify problems, and to formulate and implement their own solutions non-violently and effectively?
- (2) Is the initiative built on a partnership that leads towards genuine ownership?³⁴

32 See Paffenholz and Reychler op cit. p.2

33 Kenneth Bush Personal Communication with Kevin Clements April 26 2004

34 Kenneth Bush to Kevin Clements ibid

These questions of whether conflict sensitive development is to be a tool of empowerment or a tool of oppression are of great importance to States and citizens all around the world.

While development assistance continues to be an area of great relevance for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, the growing body of research on the linkages between security and development has also brought to the fore other key areas that require attention. Globalization, trade, debt, private investments, natural resource management, and regional conflict formations have all emerged as areas where security and development intersect with negative or positive ramifications in intra-state conflicts and civil wars.³⁵

There seems little doubt, however, that the quest for human security, in terms of both freedom from want and freedom from fear will remain elusive unless there is renewed political will behind:

- (a) Reiterating and moving as fast as possible to implement the MDGs with each state party setting specific targets and timetables for their achievement.
- (b) Exhausting all non-violent and negotiated solutions to violent conflict before applying force and then only with explicit mandates from the Security Council.
- (c) Enhancing the capabilities of national, regional and global organisations in relation to integrating and implementing the development and security agendas.

The Millennium Plus 5 Summit is exactly the right opportunity for moving in all three of these directions. The question is whether the state parties—who are integral to the success of the United Nations—will have the courage to do so. The leaders of the world are trying to bridge some very deep divisions at the moment.

35 The literature is too extensive to be cited here. One area that merits special attention is the role of natural resources in conflict. For more information on this issue area, see IPA's research program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars under <http://ipacademy.org/programs/EACW> as well as the major World Bank research program on the Economics of Civil War, Crime and Violence headed by Paul Collier.

North America, Europe and Japan, for example, have a combined average GDP per capita of \$26,000 and account for 15% of the population. Together they account for 75% of the world's military expenditure and 95% of the world's assistance to developing countries. Three other societies, India, Indonesia and Nigeria are home to a quarter of the world's population 1.5 billion people with a combined average GDP per capita of \$US 2,000. The annual wealth of 11 African countries is less than US\$1,000 per person per year.³⁶

There is some explaining, therefore, that has to be done between the North and South. How do we explain to the world's poorest, for example, that the richest fifth of the world's people consumes 86% of all goods and services while the poorest fifth consumes just 1.3% of this amount? How do we justify the fact that the three richest people in the world have assets that exceed the combined gross domestic product of the 48 least developed countries or that the world's 225 richest individuals (of whom 60 are American with total assets of \$311 billion) have a combined wealth of over \$1 trillion which is equal to the annual income of the poorest 47% of the entire world's population? How do we explain to Africans that the average African Household today consumes 20% less than it did 25 years ago while Americans spend 8 billion a year on cosmetics or \$2 billion more than the estimated annual total needed to provide basic education for everyone in the world.

In terms of security issues, how do we explain the relative global indifference to the millions that have died in Cambodia, Rwanda, Darfur, and the Eastern Congo compared to the intense policy focus on terrorism which has killed just a few thousand people in the last five years and the mess that has followed the war of choice in Iraq? It seems that the West's circle of compassion extends to its own kith and kin but not to those outside that inner circle.

³⁶ John W Foster and Pera Wells, 2005 *We The Peoples: Special Report of the UN Millennium Declaration and Beyond*, WFUNA, North-South Institute New York p.10

This is epitomised most of all in military expenditure figures. In 2004 the United States topped the poll for Milex figures. The US defence budget for 2005 is \$415 billion. This figure excludes the Iraq supplementals expected to top \$90 billion this year. The 14% increase to this year's budget was \$49 billion which is over half of what the entire world spends on Overseas Development Assistance of \$79 billion. The defence budget is larger than the combined total of the next nine biggest defence spenders. The US is responsible for 47% of the world's military spending. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the largest military spender in the world feels such high levels of insecurity and threat at the present time. Instead of focusing on regional and multilateral relationships, however, the US persists with an assertion of American exceptionalism and (when necessary) unilateralism. Both of these policy positions will always generate more fear and loathing than trust and confidence.

In the current security climate, the omens do not look bright for the United Nations strengthening co-operation for development, peace and security and dramatically increasing the resources needed to achieve the MDGs and other declaration objectives. The draft outcome document suggests only minimal changes to the UN as an institution, few new hard and fast commitments to the MDGs and limited desire to keep the development-security agendas together. Thus a good deal of the effort that has been expended on identifying the theoretical and policy implications of combining the development and security agendas will fall victim to nationalist politics.

The third world is very conscious of the fact that the US and some of its close allies, are reiterating a state centric and predominantly military view of security at the expense of development. The United States unlike the European Union is choosing to subordinate global development objectives to national security interests. Left critics argue that the focus on nation state security and good governance is being used to generate political conditions conducive to international capital rather than to advance the interests of citizens whose interests will be served indirectly if at all. There is also a strong sense that the focus on state interests will further marginalize key civil society

actors, (despite the appeals of F Cardoso's 2004 report, which argued that the UN should become much more inclusive of a wide variety of Civil Society organizations in the design and implementation of different development and security strategies . See *We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance* (<http://www.un.org/reform/panel.htm>)). The messages coming out of the preparations for the summit look as though civil society and private sector actors are not being given as much weight as foreign office and defence professionals.

In all of these “political “ discussions at both national and international levels there is little or no questioning of economic globalization, the neo-liberal economic consensus or on whether or not the integrated global market is delivering positive or negative outcomes for peoples . The strong concentration on good and bad governance and the enhancement of the nation state system is somewhat perversely resulting in what can be described as a reassertion of slightly xenophobic nationalism as manifested in more draconian anti terror legislation , heightened immigration controls and more restrictions on the free flow of refugees.

Placing the state and society at the service of the global market place (as is implied in a number of the comments coming out on the draft declaration) means that much of this millennium summit may result in decisions more likely to serve the interests of national and global capital rather than social and community needs and interests. It is, therefore, very important to continue focusing attention on wider development policies as well as the MDGs. Although they are not figuring that prominently in the preparations it is important to ensure that the MDGs are considered alongside structural adjustment programmes, global trade and finance regimes and negative consequences of global economic mismanagement.

The reality is that economic growth without a clear commitment to the redistribution of wealth will generate inequality and conflict. . The challenge is to work out ways of bringing together the democratization, sustainable development, human rights and security agendas in holistic analyses and prescription. For these analyses to have any

impact, however, they need to assume that the human security of people and citizens are the primary purpose of national, regional and global discussions. This focus stands in some tension to the view of the World Bank for example, where good governance means securing the establishment of a “well-functioning” market economy with stable property rights, enforceable contracts, high levels of transparency, and low levels of corruption. While these objectives are useful they often do not address the underlying sources of the problems that generate insecurity, fear and violence. We need to ensure that discussions about governance at all levels, local, national, regional and global structurally prioritize the elimination of poverty, hunger and inequality and satisfy the human needs for security, recognition, and welfare

The appointment of Ambassador Bolton to represent the United States at the United Nations was a deliberate slap in the face for positive multilateralism. United States reluctance to embrace the carefully balanced reform package placed on the table for the Millennium Summit by Koffi Annan also means that the “war on terror” and the “wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” are taking precedence over dealing with poverty, hunger, insecurity and violent xenophobia from all sources. The war in Iraq and terrorist threat are providing convenient excuses for governmental unwillingness in both the North and South, to assign resources for the eradication of poverty and hunger and the generation of safe, resilient and sustainable communities.

The United States, for example, has launched a last-minute drive to scrap much of a draft plan for comprehensive U.N. reform just weeks before it is to be adopted at the world Summit. They have even suggested a return to line-by-line negotiations on the document. The draft document for the Summit is intended to serve as a blueprint for bringing the world body into the 21st century. Instead of focusing on the big picture issues that affect people in the developing world or which might make a real difference to their security prospects, however, the US delegation is focusing on things like U.N. management reform -- a top U.S. priority -- rather than development and the elimination of poverty. It is also focusing on peacekeeping, terrorism and reform of the Security Council and a new Human Rights body rather than enhancing the conflict prevention

capacity of the UN and the promotion of general and complete disarmament.

A U.S. official has expressed surprise that other delegates found it unusual that Washington would seek major revisions and line-by-line negotiations. "We have been giving our input and continue to do so," said Richard Grenell, spokesman for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. "It is a thorough and exhaustive process that we will continue to work on until it's finished."³⁷ It is the section of the document on development and poverty, however, which has been the top target of the U.S. revisions, which is a tactic that is angering developing nations, which make up the overwhelming majority of the U.N. membership.³⁸

Ambassador Stafford Neil of Jamaica, chairman of the G-77, for example, has expressed disappointment that the proposed declaration focuses more heavily on the creation of new institutional structures and management reform for the United Nations rather than "a more expansive treatment" of economic and trade issues. "Given its importance in economic development," he says, trade, debt, science and technology, market access and aid should take priority over reform and restructuring.³⁹ According to a wire service report, however, the United States remains critical of the outcome document for the opposite reason: too much attention on trade and economics.

The signals coming out of New York in the few remaining days before the summit do not suggest that the most powerful state in the world is keen on the UN pursuing Human security through a more radical and rigorous combination of the development, security and human rights agendas. On the contrary it seems more intent on jostling for position and debilitating the organization than in promoting its internal and external effectiveness. Not all the blame for this can be directed at the United States alone, however, even though that country is proving to be particularly obstructive. The G77 for its part refuses to accept many of the proposals for the internal reform of the UN. Thus despite positive signals coming out of Europe in relation to expanded financing for

³⁷ See Thalif Deen August 4TH 2005 *Inter Press Service* report on UN Reform

³⁸ See Reuters report on UN Reform 14th August 2005.

³⁹ Ibid

development the overall negotiating mood at the United Nations seems more confrontational than cooperative.

The United States is particularly fixated on ensuring that the Summit document reflects its views that the biggest threats to world peace are not underdevelopment, bad neighbourhoods, or ineffective multilateral institutions but rather proliferation and terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction!

Thus the prospects for realizing the promise of Koffi Annan's report *In Larger Freedom* seem bleak. From an academic and ethical perspective, however, if the final document is anodyne and fails to grapple with the wider issue of how to generate development and security together this Summit will have been a wasted opportunity and a totally inadequate way of celebrating considerable human accomplishment in building international community.

It is vitally important that states commit themselves to meeting the MDGs at minimum. They should also work more assiduously on protecting civilians in armed conflicts and dealing with the pernicious trade in light weapons and small arms through the development of an effective small arms and light weapons convention. The UN itself needs to be better resourced as it heads into the 21st century. It remains woefully under resourced given global expectations of its task and purpose. It would also be useful if, at minimum, all states could commit to increasing their ODA to .7% of GDP within the next ten years; and would permit duty-free and quota-free access to exports from developing countries; and debt relief to the world's poorest nations. I have very strong doubts that these fairly minimal objectives will be achieved. It looks at this stage as though they are going to fall victim to national fear and paranoia and a desire to give priority to national security over the pursuit of human security in collaboration with all other member states.

I hope against the evidence that state parties even at this late stage will exercise a little more imagination. If they do not then the peoples of the United Nations will have to push

even more strongly for more active representation of civil society at these for a. The citizens of the world (as evidenced by attendance at the World Social Forum for example) understand the importance of moving beyond national interest towards an assertion of international responsibility to make the world a better place free of both fear and want. The proposals that are on the table for a Global People's Assembly begin to look more and more attractive. State parties need global citizens to hold them accountable and responsible more than at any other time in the organisation's 60 year history. If we can get our politicians to adhere to loftier objectives than those of narrow self interest then we will have something to celebrate when the United Nations turns 100!